Arabic gum: Between sovereign dreams and pitfalls of politicization: Can Sudan make it happen?| Sudanow Magazine

PortSudan(Sudanow)-What makes an agricultural commodity transform into a sovereign tool?

What made palm oil a sovereign commodity for Indonesia and Malaysia, copper a strategic tool for Chile, and cocoa a national symbol for Ecuador? Why don't we have a sovereign commodity like other countries?

Dr. Abdelazim Merghani, former Director General of the National Forests Corporation, university professor, and former Secretary-General of the National Council for Combating Desertification at the Ministry of Environment, began his conversation with Sudanow by asking: Why has Arabic gum in Sudan remained distant from being utilized as a sovereign weapon and soft power? As a natural choice, Arabic gum has stronger qualifications to play this role compared to Chilean copper, not only due to its high commercial value and rarity but also because it is a renewable product, unlike copper, which is a depletable resource. Nevertheless, the Chilean experience provides a well-established model for developing a strategic commodity within an institutional framework that clearly distinguishes between the roles of the state and producers.

Arabic gum is more suitable than Ecuadorian cocoa for strategic deployment as a commodity, not only due to its safe use and centuries-long experience but also due to its diverse applications in pharmaceutical, food, and technical industries. In contrast, Ecuadorian cocoa gained its status only after being rebranded as a luxury national brand through quality improvement, marketing development, and support for small-scale producers, without politicization or interventions beyond the economic framework.

What distinguishes Arabic gum from Indonesian and Malaysian palm oil is that it is the product of a long-standing and sustainable interaction between humans and the environment, based on local knowledge and traditional agricultural practices. This makes it an ideal candidate for integration into the "green economy" system, which seeks to balance economic growth with environmental conservation.

Dr. Abdelazim notes that despite the economic importance of palm oil, it wasn't considered a strategic commodity in Malaysia until the 1960s, when the state began organized investment in it. Thanks to a strong economic-political alliance, Malaysia was able to transform this agricultural resource from a mere raw material source into a strategic commodity and tool, enabling it to exert influence even over European and Asian markets.

This Malaysian transformation was not a coincidence, but rather the result of several deliberate steps, including gradual restrictions on crude oil exports, establishing a specialized body responsible for market regulation, scientific research, and international marketing, as well as supporting processing industries in food, cosmetics, and industrial oils, training farmers, and strengthening the role of cooperatives.

After this successful model, a pressing question arises: What didn't Sudan do with Arabic gum that Malaysia did with palm oil?

Sudan wasn't absent from the scene of initiatives; since the 1960s, it took promising steps to organize the Arabic gum sector, starting with enacting the monopoly law and establishing the Arabic Gum Company in 1969, to undertake tasks similar to those assigned by Malaysia to its specialized body for palm oil.

A commodity council was established in 2009, accompanied by the liberalization of the sector from the monopoly system. This was followed by the development of a comprehensive strategic plan (2020-2030) with clear objectives and specific projects, including the implementation of executive procedures for exporting processed gum in gradual steps, as well as organizing over 4,500 cooperatives for small-scale producers.

On paper, the steps taken by Sudan seem to closely match what Malaysia did. However, the question remains: Why didn't Sudan achieve similar results?

The answer doesn't lie in a lack of initiatives or absence of plans, but rather in the absence of a stable institutional environment that separates economy and politics, and provides sovereign will that prioritizes national interest over immediate and narrow considerations.

Despite having the resources, a rich legacy of knowledge about the tree, and the largest share of the global market, these advantages have not been translated into effective influence or strategic gains. Arabic gum remains confined to the realm of a "sovereign dream," a dream hanging precariously from the tree, and constantly threatened by the risk of politicization or market fluctuations that could drive the world to seek alternatives and open the door to new competitors.

This highlights the importance of reviewing past experiences, particularly those that revealed weaknesses in managing this strategic resource, as demonstrated by the 2001 study by the National Forests Corporation in collaboration with FAO, which included a global market survey conducted by British expert John Coppen. Additionally, the 2012 study by the Sterling Group, commissioned by the National Forests Corporation, aimed to explore global demand and identify opportunities for Sudanese gum in international markets.

These two studies, among other things, highlighted the erosion of consumer confidence in Arabic gum and the undermining of trust in Sudan's ability to ensure a steady supply of gum to global markets. This was evident in seasons 73/1974 and 84/1985, when Sudan capitalized on production shortages in West African countries due to drought, and in 92/1993, when locust swarms affected Sudan's production, to maximize hard currency earnings by selling gum through tenders.

As a result, prices surged by over 400% compared to the beginning of the season, prompting global markets to seek synthetic gum alternatives that were cheaper and more stable than natural gum, which eventually captured 30% of the global gum market. The supply shortages and price hikes also led consumers to attempt to break Sudan's monopoly on the global gum market by encouraging other competing countries to increase their gum production and revising the Arabic gum specification to include Acacia seyal gum, which these countries specialize in, in addition to the Acacia senegal gum that Sudan is known for.

In the 1990s, when the price of a ton of gum reached around $4,200, exports declined and stockpiles accumulated, confirming that short-term political pricing does not create a developmental strategy but rather hinders growth and undermines economic sustainability. This led to attempts to break Sudan's monopoly on the global gum market, starting with the expansion of the Arabic gum specification in 1998 to include Acacia seyal gum alongside the Acacia senegal gum that Sudan specializes in, which is priced at less than a third of the latter.

This specification opened the door wide for the export of Acacia seyal gum, to the point that its exports now account for over 80% of Sudan's total exports in global markets, resulting in Sudan losing a significant portion of its hard currency earnings.

The adoption of the 1998 specification led to an increase in the number of African countries producing Arabic gum from 8 countries before the specification to 15 countries after it.

In the context of efforts to break Sudan's monopoly on the global gum market, international companies have consistently paid higher prices for gum from Nigeria and Chad than for Sudanese gum, despite the latter's superior quality. This reflects a distortion in the market value of a strategic product and raises questions about whether we are giving this resource the attention and planning it deserves.

In conclusion, Dr. Abdelazim Merghani states that Arabic gum remains a legitimate and noble sovereign dream, but its realization depends on transitioning from the pitfalls of politicization to sound management. What Sudan lacks is not resources or visions, but the institutional will to turn the dream into reality.

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