The Benishangul Region: History and Current Implications| Sudanow Magazine

Khartoum (Sudanow Magazine) – What has been circulating in recent weeks through open-source information, published international intelligence reports, supported by satellite imagery, and investigative reports by several international newspapers and magazines, indicates that the Ethiopian region of Benishangul is on its way to becoming a tool in the "periphery" policy pursued by the terrorist Dagalo militia and its supporters to destabilize eastern Sudan. This comes after repeated reports of the imminent closure of rebel supply lines westward through Libya and Chad, whether due to escalating military or intelligence pressure.

To understand the details of this scenario, we turned to Dr. Bashir Ahmed Mohi El-Din, an expert on the history and conflicts of the Horn of Africa.

-What does geography say about the Benishangul region?.

-Benishangul region is located in the southwestern part of Ethiopia. It is a large region that has witnessed numerous events and a period of tension between Sudan and Ethiopia since the establishment of the Funj Sultanate in 1504, as it borders Sudan to the southeast.
The region comprises ninety-nine mountains, each representing a specific tribe, in addition to the Ethiopian highland population who were forcibly relocated to the area as part of a government policy aimed at altering the region's demographics.

Also the region is rich in resources, including minerals such as gold, copper, zinc, and marble. Despite these potentials, it lacks industrial activity and specific infrastructure.

-Given that the present is inseparable from the past, what does history have to say about this region?.

-"Recorded history tells us that the 1902 agreement between the British colonial government of Sudan at the time and the King of Ethiopia stipulated that King Menelik II would retain the predominantly Muslim, Arabic-speaking region of Benishangul, in exchange for Ethiopia's commitment not to construct any dams on the Blue Nile without the consent of Egypt and Sudan."

This means that the region was never an integral part of Ethiopia, but rather was either an independent entity or part of Sudan by virtue of ethnicity, geography, and culture.

-What is the opinion of the region's inhabitants regarding this agreement?.

-"As soon as the region was annexed, its inhabitants began to be treated as second-class citizens. Therefore, 1931 witnessed the first official rebellion against the imperial authorities at the time, followed by a series of rebellions against successive Ethiopian governments, interspersed with periods of relative stability."

-The demands of the region's inhabitants center on the return of their region to Sudanese territory, based on the premise that their land and people are an inseparable part of Sudan. However, this demand was met with violence and rejection by the imperial authorities. Even the demand for autonomy within the Ethiopian state was met with force during the reigns of Menelik II, Haile Selassie, and Mengistu Haile Mariam.

This led to the emergence of the "Benishangul Liberation Movement" to resist what it considered an Abyssinian occupation. The movement continued its struggle, as its people see themselves as Sudanese, sharing the same customs and traditions in terms of language, dress, and heritage. Therefore, they resisted the attempts at demographic engineering led by Emperor Haile Selassie, which involved settling Oromo and Amhara people in their lands, opening churches, and imposing Amharic as the official language.

-Under whose rule was the region used to exert pressure on Sudan?.

-The first to initiate this was former Ethiopian President Mengistu Haile Mariam in the mid-1980s. When the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) rebellion erupted in South Sudan, Mengistu opened the Benishangul-Gumuz region to them, allowing the SPLM to occupy the towns of Kurmuk and Qaysan on multiple occasions. Each time, the Sudanese government recaptured them, but only after paying a heavy price in equipment and personnel.

Similarly, under the current Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed, the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) was completed in the Benishangul-Gumuz region, less than 100 kilometers from the Sudanese border. This poses a significant danger and a strategic threat to Sudanese national security. The use of the dam's water as a weapon could lead to the flooding of vast areas of Sudanese land inhabited by more than twenty million people (out of a total population of 48 million).

The Ethiopian government has brought in Israeli companies to invest in agricultural lands and annex the resource-rich al-Fashqa region, posing a threat to Sudanese national security, despite numerous negotiations between the Sudanese and Ethiopian governments that have failed to reach a mutually agreeable solution.

-Would the people of the region agree to their land being used to destabilize Sudan?.

-Information from multiple sources indicates that Ethiopia is currently harboring the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) militia on the border, having opened camps and drone landing strips for them, in alliance with the Sudan People's Liberation Movement-North (SPLM-N) faction led by Joseph Teka, to threaten the Blue Nile region and open a new front in the conflict. This is something rejected by the leaders of the Benishangul-Gumuz Liberation Movement (BLM-N) and could lead to a significant deterioration in Sudanese-Ethiopian relations, which are already strained.

What information is available about what is being planned there against Sudan?.

-The expert on military and security issues in the Horn of Africa explained that, based on the images circulating in the media, the camp is designed to accommodate at least 10,000 soldiers at a time. These forces are undoubtedly not Ethiopian, meaning they are intended for the terrorist RSF militia. He did not rule out the possibility that it includes mercenaries from South Sudan and Colombia.

The camp is located in the village of Qishan, which is the last Ethiopian point before the border and is characterized by rugged terrain. He explained that construction work had been completed, and the camp was scheduled to be officially opened next February. However, given the recent military expansion by the Sudanese army, Ethiopia is expected to reconsider its plans.

-What are the implications of this for the Ethiopian domestic situation?.

-If an infiltration front is opened through the militia, the region, which is already experiencing a state of security instability, could be exploited by the Benishangul Liberation Movement. This would be disastrous and further complicate an already tense situation. This is precisely what the Ethiopian government fears, especially since the Ethiopian state is facing rebel movements in those areas, whether from the Tigray, Oromo, or Amhara groups who are rebelling against Addis Ababa.

Undoubtedly, the Sudanese government will not stand idly by. It will work to confront the Ethiopian government, and it is not unlikely that Sudan will adopt the same tactics Ethiopia is currently employing to pressure Sudan.

In my opinion, what the Ethiopian government is doing is more of an adventure and a capitulation to external pressures than a plan to achieve its strategic interests. This threatens to plunge the entire region into a devastating spiral of violence. It's worth noting that Ethiopia's interests in a stable Sudan far outweigh its interests in an unstable one.

-Based on your experience with the history of conflicts in the region, what advice would you give?.

-The Sudanese army should accelerate its advance on the various battlefronts. Conversely, the pressure to open a new front in Blue Nile will subside, as Joseph Teka's forces (the SPLM-N) are weak, and support for the militia from the people of Blue Nile is even weaker. This presents an opportunity for the Sudanese army to conduct preemptive operations against these militia strongholds in Blue Nile.

Furthermore, the military balance still favors the Sudanese army on both the Blue Nile and Kordofan fronts in general.

In light of the available data, it is clear that the Benishangul region remains a geopolitical flashpoint in the Horn of Africa, where regional and international interests intersect, and where historical and ethnic tensions are exploited as tools for pressure and bargaining. Using the region as a platform to threaten Sudanese national security, whether through harboring armed militias or opening new fronts of conflict, not only threatens Sudan's stability but also opens the door to an internal Ethiopian explosion that could prove difficult to contain.

Given this complex landscape, a balanced strategic move by Sudan, combining decisive military action with political acumen, is urgently needed.

-What is happening today is not merely a border conflict or a passing political dispute?.

it is a true test of the region's ability to avoid sliding into chaos and to build relationships based on shared interests and mutual respect.

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