Popular Revolution Future in Egypt in Light of Interaction of the Flexible and Inflexible Powers of Influence: An External Vision
29 March, 2011
Khartoum, March 2011 (Sudanow) - As it is clear from the title, this is an external vision, although I happen to know Egypt very well from within. I know its people, its forces, its influential figures and its political institutions.
During my numerous visits to that country over the past twenty years or so, I met all prominent officials of the defunct regime, starting from President Mubarak down to his subordinates several times. It is no secret that relationship between our two political regimes were extremely strained at the outset, but we realized, thanks to bitter experiences of severance and animosity, that there are strategic principles governing our bilateral relations which the two parties must value, notwithstanding discords between the political regimes. We viewed that the crisis between the two countries were partially due to what we believed to be failure of the Egyptian regime to veer Egypt into resuming its leading and vital role in the region.
We also believed that the aggressive attitude by the West towards Sudan resulting in its division was a direct outcome of Egypt's failure to retake its lead role. For these reasons, we were much concerned with any event that occurs within Egypt. I am sure that these concerns are not harboured by the Sudan alone but whatever happens in Egypt is of concern to all Muslims, to all Arabs and other peoples of the developing countries.
The present essay is not a sort of advice but is, rather, a good-will attempt to shade some light onto the new situation there. When making an inventory following the elapse of the primary stages of the revolution-any revolution- are over, and the feverish rejoicing calms down, one discerns influential heavy-weight powers that rest the compass for the future developments. Some of those powers are of a hard core and are inflexible while the others are soft or are flexible and whereas the former property is not necessarily of a positive value that adds to power, the latter property is not necessarily a negative value that adds to weakness. Both properties serve to distinguish some powers from others and the soft or flexible powers and elements may be more effective in the long term than the hard-core and inflexible ones. However, generally, the latter powers have a direct way of predictably influencing the developments while the soft and flexible powers have an indirect way of incurring an unforeseen impact on the developments..JPG)
There are two gauges that may enable us decide whether a given power could be classified as solid or soft; the first gauge is the internal system of that power, whether it is solid or soft, and the other one is the package of ideas and norms that control the movement of this power and determine its inclination towards conservatism or towards change and innovation. It is obvious that the hard-core powers are more disciplined and inclined towards conservatism while the flexible ones are less disciplined and more inclined towards change and innovation.
Applying this brief methodology, I would deduce that there are five major powers –each with its own field of influence- that are more capable than others of persistency and interaction with the Egyptian environment over the coming years, rather, decades, to identify the results of the popular revolution, a historic event, that spread all over that country.
Paradoxically enough, the influential power that has emerged first on the Egyptian arena in the aftermath of the popular revolution was the armed forces which I define as a hard-core power that possesses a disciplined organization soldering and holding together its parts and components. It also upholds national ideas and traditions that constitute a creed governing the behavior of each of its individuals. These properties make any armed forces an entity whose alternatives, preferences, actions and reactions could be fairly accurate predicted.
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Based on this premise, the armed forces can be regarded as a conservative factor rather than a factor of revolution and change as it is more likely that any armed forces are, in essence, based on the notion of defense and protection rather than demolition and change. This argument cannot be reversed by citing instances of coups d'etat by armed forces because coups essentially contract the nature of the regular armed forces and are often executed away from the existing command. The armed forces, as an organized body, are often disciplined and controlled by orders of their commanders and are in conformity with the prevailing conditions of their communities.
This definition, however, does not libel the historic role played by the Egyptian armed forces in courageously siding with popular revolution, but is only meant to outline the boundaries within which those forces operate. They are expected to serve as the main actor during the coming six or twelve months in keeping order and maintaining the entity of the state as well as taking major decisions for completing the revolution's programme (the constitutional amendments, disbanding the parliament and legislative assembly, formation of the government, etc.). But the immediate role of the armed forces in taking momentous political decision will eventually ebb, leaving the matter in the hands of the new political institutions which are still to be formed and which will fall under the influence of the other powers and the framework within which they operate.
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Yet, the Egyptian Armed Forces will not be totally deprived of their role in the Egyptian political action, considering that the Israeli and war threats are looming; The Egyptian Armed forces will remain a motivating forces and a national symbol in which the ideas of the Egyptian nation are embodied, thus claiming its political impact but not from that matter, directly involved in coups d’état.
Coming second to the armed forces in effecting influence and resembling them in solidity is what I call popular bureaucracy which is a combination of the values, ideological norms and behavioral determinants that are crystallized by accumulated historic experience, harsh physical and human geography and administrative systems which have not changed much for millenniums, at least in the Egyptian rural areas and country-side. This popular bureaucracy, the role of which would be underestimated and played down by some of us because it is not a physical entity, derives its power from the internal impact on the individuals and their communities. It is practiced in the known bureaucratic offices and goes beyond that to the educational institute, universities, markets, clubs, political parties and societies. It is logical that this bureaucracy may be a factor of stagnation, conservatism and resistance to change. One can clearly note the role this bureaucracy plays in narrowing the opportunities of the young people in assuming the leadership and when one views the leadership class in any walk of life in Egypt (political parties, sports cubs, companies, etc.) one finds that the average age of the leaderships is not less than 70 years. It is true that the growing middle class in Egypt, which has played a major role in the popular revolution, is in a continuous state of rebellion against this mentality, but this will take long to be eliminated and will thus remain a major obstacle to the policy of renewal and renovation.
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The third influential power is what will be determined by the fate of the popular revolution which has dominated and inspired the political events; and, although this is a vague term, I prefer to describe it as a youthful revolutionary status in an attempt to identify the important ingredients of the revolution which made the unique historic event a reality. The most powerful component of the revolution was the crushing strong alliance between the young people, with their creative energies and ambitions, on one hand, and the communication technology, with its boundless capabilities, on the other. I call it a revolutionary state because, judging by its organization and ideas, it has reached a level of flexibility that brought it close to total liquidity, and this feature was, paradoxically, its most effective instrument, just as water and air, despite their liquidity or maybe because of their liquidity, constitute the strongest factors of erosion, graving and shaping in nature. Commentators noted that the organization of this revolutionary state was a spontaneous one by the masses, rather than a partisan or trade unionist organization. This unconventional organization bestowed upon it an effective decentralized character that made it spread over all villages, hamlets, towns, parks and open areas. And with this multiple formation, it has managed to confuse one of the most powerful security apparatus in equipment, number and organization and made it turn around in all directions without being able to fix its target. This was the most effective means of neutralizing and defeating the security machine.
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As regards the ideas that fuelled the revolution, the absence of the ideological slogans has enabled the Egyptians achieve rare state of unanimity that was summed up in the simple and unique slogan that was persistently chanted by the masses in a way that, with its strength, could crack the rocks, "The People Want the regime toppled." The revolution was not in need of anything more than this slogan. The continuity of an effective youthful revolutionary state depends on its decentralized organization, keeping its leadership unanimous and mingling with the youths.
Any attempt to make the leadership of this revolutionary state public will enable its enemies to build an idol of this leadership and stone it. In this way, it will be like the conventional political leaderships and will be an easy target for criticism and destruction. So, the strongest chance of continuity for the youthful revolutionary state is to remain as it is: a state without a central leadership and a clandestine power that depends on rallying the energies of the young people of all colours and a movement that utilizes the communication technology in a most effective way.
The fourth power consists of the organizing forces which I tend to classify as part of the flexible powers because they are capable of renewing their ideas and organizational models to cope with the current challenges. Those parties greatly vary amongst themselves and in their capacity of influencing the next stage. I will cite as an example the Muslim Brotherhood movement which some categorize as a solid, rather than a flexible power because its members uphold forerunner Islamic thought and tend, not only to maintain the old thought but also to unearth the forgotten one to resurrect it. Regardless of this indecency towards the forerunner thought, an in-depth examination of this movement since its start as an Islamic preaching organization in the third decade of the 20th century, through the militancy towards the end of the fifth decade, then the political persecution, harassment and isolation in the 1950s and 1960s and lastly the current political maturity, shows that the Muslim Brotherhood possesses a tremendous flexibility in diversifying its organizational models and renovating its ideas as well as a capability of setting its priorities and peaceful coexistence with the other political forces in Egypt. These features will make of the Muslim Brotherhood movement the most important politically organized faction in the coming stage, availing the other Islamic movement throughout the Muslim world with an unprecedented opportunity to follow suit of the Egyptian movement and become closely linked with their respective peoples of a considerable influence on the political regimes within which they operate.
The fifth power is made up of the foreign forces and their plans, namely the United States of America, Europe and Israel. These forces are opportunist by their very nature and the narrow view of their interests, and for this reason, the last thing these forces wish is to see Egypt a powerful nation and of an influence on its surroundings. These forces will, however, cover up their positions and demands by such humanitarian slogans as human rights and democracy while, in reality, they will seek to weaken Egypt through sanctions, debts and curbing assistance. These measures and policies of the West will be painful at the beginning because they will delay economic recovery and improvement of the living conditions which are, naturally, among the main demands by the masses of the revolution. But in spite of this, free, democratic Egypt has an opportunity to become the strongest economic power in the region, probably in Africa, judging from its geographic situation, its big population and its human resources.
The above-mentioned presentation has covered the most important powers that affect the fate of the revolution without touching on the context within which the revolution operates; although this context is, of course, not less important than the powers in reaching the results and determining the fate. The most important elements of the context at present include the living conditions of the Egyptian people. Despite the high hopes for economic reform and anti-corruption measures that will be incurred by the revolutionary change, the fruits of this effort will not be reaped overnight, particularly under the persistent demands and the great expectations that follow mass revolutions. This tendency is expressed in the daily demonstrations that call for improvement of the terms of service, even by those who were in the first line of defense of the defunct regime.
Another important element in the political context is the struggle against Israel which has reached its most complex stage with the final victory the extreme Zionist forcers in Israel under an acute split in the Palestinian ranks. In contrast, there are chances of resistance against Israel in the Arab and Islamic countries, in general, and in Gaza Strip and Lebanon, in particular. Egypt can effectively utilize these facts within an Arab consensus under its leadership, a matter which will redouble its political weight despite attempts by the international powers to bring it into their ranks.
Another political issue that will affect Egypt's future and fate is the development southwards in Sudan and beyond Sudan and the water resources. Paradoxically enough, this 2011 has turned out to be fateful for both countries – the secession of south Sudan and the victory of the popular revolution in Egypt. It was said that if the Egyptian revolution had occurred several years ago, southern Sudan would not have seceded. This might have been true, but the fact is that the south has seceded, creating a new reality which is both negative and positive, and freeing the Sudanese politics from the southern question. Also the Egyptian revolution has erupted, creating a new reality in Egypt and in the region as well. Both parts of the Nile Valley will certainly regret the secession of the south, but there will appear beyond this regret, new chances of embarking on implementing projects of integration and unification in all parts of the two countries to be based on new joint visions of regional security as well as human and economic development. These visions will not be based on political ideologies or ethnical bonds.
Lastly, the present context includes an Egyptian role of liberation that goes beyond the Arab and Islamic countries to cover the developing countries; that is, the revival of the old dream after a period during which Jamal Abdul Nassir and Sadat passed away and Mubarak departed and the Egyptian armies have crossed the Suez Canal and recaptured Sinai, the Soviet Union, "the supporter of the Arab nation", collapsed and a revolution has erupted in Egypt after which there be no return to the past.
The question is, can we demand of Egypt to offer more than what it can afford at this historic moment? This maybe appropriate; but revolutions supply peoples with new dreams and peoples without dreams are only human lumps that aimlessly crowd together, sheer unconscious victims to the powers of imperialism, evil and hegemony. And if peoples have the right of expression with the revolution, they also have the right to dream. The saying "if a person is resolved to reach the Pleiades, he will get there," is true. A remarkably inspiring headline I have recently read about the popular revolution in Egypt was one of an article by Mohamed Hassanain Haikal which read: "The Egyptians have crossed to the era of free peoples". Egypt might not have crossed to the free peoples' age but have certainly put foot on the start of the road to that destination. The march will be painstaking but when it crosses, it will meet the new free Turkey which will be waiting on the other bank. And this meeting will result in an opportunity of a renaissance that could never be repeated in history, and one day, we may all find ourselves on the other bank, why not?
Dr Ghazi Salahuddin Atabani, an Islamic strategist - thinker and a politician who has been playing vital roles in the Sudanese political scenes for now decades, and a key figure within the Islamic movement in the Sudan, also known for his masterly writing in Sudanese politics, published this article-
Originally in Arabic in the independent daily Al Rae Al am, 19th of February 2011, - translated for Sudanow by Mohamed Ali Saeed/ sub-edited By Mohamed Osman Adam
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