Interview with: Prominent Islamic Leader , Al-Tayeb Zain al-Abdin The Islamic movements in the Arab Spring countries made concessions
14 August, 2012
Khartoum, (sudanow.info.sd)- Professor Al-Tayeb Zain al-Abdin opened up his heart and revealed to SUDANOW hitherto ndeclared secrets about the split of the Islamic movement in the Sudan and the reasons that made the majority support President Omar al-Beshir.
He also explained that the reality compels the Islamic movements that took power through the Arab Spring to make concessions, indicating the disparities between those movements from one country to another. The Professor also dwelt on the special features of the Islamic movements and their relationship with the Sudanese Islamic movement.
SUDANOW: Would you highlight the present Sudanese political situation and the impact of the developments on the Sudan, especially in the Arab countries?
Professor Zain: The situation in the Sudan seems to be a political effort as manifested by unsuccessful National Congress Party (NCP) attempts to persuade the opposition parties into joining a broad-based government.
Sudanow: I beg your pardon, if we agree that the National Umma Party (NUP) has declined to join, the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) has taken part in the government with a presidential assistant.
Prof. Zain: Even the DUP, its bases are opposed to participation in the government and, due to the boycott by other parties, which are more active and more effective in the political arena, the broad-based government has not materialized.
Question: More effective than the NCP?
Answer: No, but we are considering its attempts to persuade other parties. It could not attract an effective force for participation in the government.
Question: In your viewpoint, as a leading figure in the Islamic movement, was there a consensus within the movement on the coup on June 30, 1989?
Answer: In fact, throughout its history, the Islamic movement had no plans of seizing power in a military coup but the movement was active within the army, which would protect it.
Question: Pardon me, hasn’t the seizure of power through a military coup been presented to the organs of the Islamic movement?
Answer: The coup plan was presented during the months that preceded the Salvation, to the 27-member executive board that represents the central committee of the movement.
Question: What were the motives?
Answer: The motives were specific. We wanted the coup for specific reasons, the first of which was that the rebel movement in the South was expanding northwards and reached Qaissan, Kurmuk and the peripheries in the White Nile and South Kordofan. The then government was so weak that the SPLM could reach Khartoum and for this reason, it was imperative to take power from this weak government.
The second reason was that there were three plans for a coup within the army by the May regime elements, the Baathists and a number of factions in the marginalized regions. Therefore, whether the Islamic movement made the coup, there were other people who would make it and were ready to do so and any successful coup would target the Islamic movement because they were aware that we were of more influence and popularityand we had a presence in the army.
The third reason for staging a military coup was that we were quite ready for a successful one.
The fourth reason was that the West would not allow us in the Islamic movement to reach power through democracy.
Those were the reasons which were presented at the meeting and according to which the coup plan was approved.
Question: Was the date of coup fixed and was a time limit set to continue in power?
Answer: Yes, it was decided that after seizure of power through the coup, there would be a military rule for three years after which we would go back to the civilian regime and the Islamic movement would contestwith other parties for power.
Question: Did the central committee of the movement approve those details?
Answer: The details were not presented to the central committee but were forwarded by executive bureau which was less in number from the executive board and were approved by the executive bureau, which was close to the general secretariat, that was, the secretary general plus six, i.e., seven members who consulted other people and reached that result.
Question: what was the aim of seizing power for three years and returning to the democracy once again?
Answer: The aim was to resist the present coup attempts within the army, check the SPLM expansion northwards, improve the then deteriorating living situation, correct the economic and military situation and secure the country.
Question: Why wasn’t this aim achieved?
Answer: Because they found themselves in dilemma of various confrontations such as the economic situation and external confrontations even with the Arab countries, especially after the war in Kuwait and the Sudan support to Iraq in its invasion of Kuwait. This support decision was erroneous and politically stupid and damaged our relations with the Arabs. The government thus found itself in a dilemma and, for this reason; it did not want to get into an internal confrontation. Furthermore, the people who had carried out the coup would not accept to go and would resist.
Question: Was it true that, during the first days of the Salvation, Turabi asked Hassan al-Beshir to step down and form a civilian government?
Answer: I haven’t heard of that because I left the Sudan in 1990 and I couldn’t say, as a witness, what had happened. Turabi asked Beshir to dissolve the revolutionary council and nominate himself (Beshir) for the presidency as a transitional period prior to political competition as the 1998 constitution permits the existence of political parties. The taken measures came late and had no effect on the political arenaand what was agreed upon was not carried out. What complicated the transition was the departure of the opposition to operate from Asmara along with SPLM leader John Garang who joined the opposition as a military faction, earning support by the US and even by some Arab countries. Moreover, it was difficult for those in power to step down.
Question: Did you expect the NCP split and was there an actual disparity of opinion between the NCP leaders before the split?
Answer: It was a struggle for power on the highest level of the Salvation regime, particularly between Beshir and Turabi, each with a group around him, while the bases were distant from this struggle which began with what came to be called the Memorandum of Ten that was submitted by 10 senior NCP members that empowered Beshir and weakened Turabi.Before this memorandum, there were frictions but did not lead to a specific result. The Memorandum of Ten was inspired by Beshir and the signatories were sympathizers of Beshir’s viewpoint. It was preceded by other memoranda, including one that was submitted by Ibrahim Ahmed Omar that was rejected.
Question: Was it submitted to Ali Osman Taha?
Answer: Yes, it was submitted to him but he refused to sign and refused to take part in the NCP Consultative Council.
Question: Why do you think?
Answer: I think it is proper to put this question to Osman. (Irritably) let me finish to you the question of the power struggle and jurisdictions. The Parliament, led by Turabi, began a debate on the constitution to provide for election of the governors of the states and for creation of a prime minister position. The President firmly rejected the prime ministerial proposal, which prompted him to dissolve the parliament along with the NCP General Secretariat during the NCP General Congress in October 1999. In May 2005, Beshir called for convening a general conference to rescind the resolutions of the 1999 Congress and take up the leadership of the NCP and the states, to take control of the state and the party.
Question: What were the expectations by Turabi after the split? Was he expected to have the majority on his side?
Answer:Turabi is courageous and intrepid and accepts challenges but his expectation was wrong, counting on the youths whom he brought up since school and forgetting the power temptation. The majority aligned with the President. The military service men, whom he was counting on, also sided with President Bashir. It ended up with Turabi forming a separate political party of a limited membership.
Question: What are4 the disparities and similarities between the Sudanese Islamic movements and the Islamic movements in the Arab Spring countries.
Answer: They agree on the general goals but differ on details of reaching power. Some Islamic movements accept the democracy but not on its continuity. It is debatable whether they will accept the democracy even if it involved secular parties opposed to the Islamic. All this was a topic of discussion within the Islamic movements and was not settled yet. Even the Islamic movement in Egypt5, for instance, stood against candidacy to the presidency by a woman and a Coptic either, although the chances of winning the offices by either were slim, but the fact that you oppose their candidacy means that you do not accept democracy as it is; and till as recently as 2009 some of them would not the full right to citizenship and, therefore, there exists a lack of faith in democracy. What I’m saying is that the Islamic movements did not discuss the democracy in the past but the issue is now brought to debate.
Question: Why did they accept now?
Answer: Because it has become a matter of fact and if you ask the Islamic movement whether a Copt would be nominated, they would not object and so with a woman. The political action is not for a theorist who stands at a distance and calls for applying the theoretical provisions. The political reality imposes itself on the people. There are fundamentalist and conservative elements within the Islamic movements but they were faced with the reality, they had no alternative other than accept this situation and the present Deputy Chairman of Islamic Freedom and Justice Party is a Copt.
Question: How did the Islamic movement dealt with the reality in the Sudan?
Answer: The reality made the Islamic movement highly pragmatic to the extent it has become opportunist and operates with the necessity jurisprudence and silent consensus approved many things to cope with the reality and the political continuity. The Islamic movements suffer a lack of clarity between the true democratic vision and the theory and practice that will force them, even the Egyptian fundamentalists, to offer compromises for gaining the people’s support.
Question: Why do you think the Libyan Islamic movement has not won the elections like other Islamic movements in the countries of the Arab Spring upheavals?
Answer: They are not united and they don’t have a powerful political party, either.
Question: But they have leaders who are politically competent.
Answer: No, a leader cannot create a party by himself. Take Turabi as an example. He continued for 30 years building a political party, brick-by-brick and step by step and made an effective and influential party. In 1986, we, the Islamists, won the elections of the graduate constituencies in addition to two constituencies in the South. However, thinkers who sit one in Britain, another in America, Holland and France cannot build an influential party in reality. The Reform Coalition, for instance, is a powerful party and in Syria, there is a powerful Islamic movement that engaged in confrontation with Hafez Assad in 1982 and 10,000 people were killed in Hamate with artillery and missiles, just as Bashar is doing right now. In Libya, there was no political presence since the Sanousy regime until that of Kaddafi. Mahmoud Gibril did not win alone but there was an alliance of 17 parties with him. The Islamists alone won 17 seats while the alliance won 39 seats of Parliament.
Question: How could the Islamic movement Turkey maintain relations with the West?
Answer: The Constitution in Turkey provides for a secular state and is protected by the secular judiciary and army while the majority of the academic sector sides with and defends secularism. Those sectors are powerful and influential and insurmountable.
Question: But they won majority in the former parliament.
Answer: They did this after they openly accepted secularism in the 1990s and now they enjoy an exclusive majority and the army cannot make any change. They have the president who enjoys powers even over the army itself. Turkey is a member of the NATO, intends to join the European Union and is a neighbour of the West and therefore, they enjoy an excellent status. The Islamic movement in Yemen, for instance, cannot be as acceptable as Turkey; so the success is bound with the surrounding circumstances. Personally, I am not contented with the performance of the Sudanese Islamic movement, which could have set an example of a better rule. In 1987, we accepted, in our constitution that the citizenship to all people, including non-Muslims, be a basis for rights and duties in the Sudan charter. In addition, we were the first Islamic movement that accepted woman representation within the legislature, and even at the level of the Council of Ministers. The Islamic movement includes a more cultured and educated membership than all Sudanese parties together.
Question: The Islamic movement still exists, what is required of it?
Answer: It does not exist. It has to come out in the open as an independent party and, after that, it can align with this government, if it wants. Where are the leaders of the Islamic movement now, except those within the government such as Ali Osman Taha, Ibrahim Ahmed Omar, Osman Al-Hadi and Ahmed Ibrahim Al-Tahir? They don’t have the right to criticize the State and the government. This was the reason for its dissolution from the outset so that it could not correct the State months after inception of the National Salvation Revolution, because it had no legal status.
Question: The movement is frozen rather than dissolved?
Answer: What exist now are inactive bodies with no role to play. The Islamic movement was the only party that vanished after the Salvation seized power.
Question: To what extent will the West recognize the Islamic movements that reach power through democratic elections?
Answer: The West will not welcome the Islamic movements whatever means they use to reach power, but it is pragmatic and since they reach power in a democratic way, it has to deal with them, particularly in such strategic countries as Egypt, Libya, Syria and Yemen. The West sponsors the mottos of democracy, human rights and elections and cannot disown those mottoes and for this reason, it could not stand openly against any democratic movement in any country. This was the case even with Ayatollah Khomeini, although the Shah was an ally of the West. When Khomeini took power through a democratic people’s revolution, the Shah was denied entry to the US. Zain Al-Abdin bin Ali tried to go to France but was prevented because the revolution was made by the people and it was not possible to challenge the revolutionaries. The West, therefore, deals with the Islamic movements that take power in a democratic way, despite its hatred for those movements.
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